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Bridges over Troubled Waters ± An Interdisciplinary Framework for Evaluating the 
Interconnectedness within Fragmented Domestic Flood Risk Management Systems  
Herman Kasper Gilissen1, Meghan Alexander, Jean-Christophe Beyers, Piotr Chmielewski, 
Piotr Matczak, Thomas Schellenberger, Cathy Suykens2 3  
ABSTRACT ± Diversification of strategies in Flood Risk Management (FRM) is widely 
regarded as a necessary step forward in terms of lessening the likelihood and magnitude of 
flooding, as well as minimizing the exposure of people and property, and in turn the 
disruption, economic damage, health impacts and other adverse consequences that ensue 
when floods occur. Thus, diversification is often heralded as an essential condition for 
enhancing societal resilience to flooding. However, an inevitable consequence of diversifying 
strategies and practices in FRM is that it can lead to fragmentation within FRM systems, in 
terms of the distribution of responsibilities between actors and governing rules enacted within 
different policy domains. This can prove detrimental to the effectiveness of FRM.  
Building upon the notion of fragmentation developed in legal and governance literature, this 
paper introduces the coQFHSW RI µEULGJLQJ PHFKDQLVPV¶ LH instruments that remedy 
fragmentation by enhancing interconnectedness between relevant actors through information 
transfer, coordination and cooperation. This paper develops a typology of both fragmentation 
and bridging mechanisms and analyzes their relations, partly drawing upon empirical 
research conducteG ZLWKLQ WKH (8 µ67$5-)/22'¶ project. In turn, this paper outlines a 
novel interdisciplinary methodological framework for evaluating the degree and quality of 
the interconnectedness within fragmented domestic FRM systems. A pragmatic, flexible and 
broadly applicable tool, this framework is both suited for academic purposes, as well as for 
practically oriented analysis and (re)development of fragmented FRM systems, and 
potentially other fragmented systems, within the EU and abroad.                                                                     
KEY WORDS ± Bridging mechanisms; cooperation; coordination; diversification; 
evaluation framework; flood risk management; fragmentation; interconnectedness; 
information transfer; societal resilience     
1. Introduction 
EU policy and legislation on Flood Risk Management (FRM) aim at the reduction of the 
adverse consequences of floods for human health, the environment, cultural heritage and 
economic activity.4 In order to achieve this central aim, in the literature, five potential 
strategies have been distinguished, namely prevention, defense, mitigation, preparation & 
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response, and recovery following floods.5 6 Defense and mitigation strategies lessen the 
likelihood and magnitude of flooding through the use of measures that act to resist (e.g. 
dykes) or accommodate (e.g. flood storage areas, adaptive building) water, respectively.7 
Accompanying this, the prevention strategy aims to minimize the exposure of people and 
property to flooding, for example, through the use of spatial planning conditions (e.g. 
building restrictions).8 At a time where it must be accepted that not all floods can be 
prevented everywhere, the strategies for preparation & response and recovery employ a range 
of measures that aim to lessen the adverse consequences that ensue when floods occur, such 
as emergency management and insurance or compensation mechanisms, respectively.9 
It has generally been assumed that effectively implementing each of the five FRM strategies 
and moving beyond defense-dominated approaches ± also referred to as diversification ± 
increases societal resilience to flooding.10 Research into domestic FRM systems shows that 
diversification is institutionalized to varying degrees throughout the EU.11 However, such 
diversification has resulted in different degrees of fragmentation, with FRM strategies 
implemented through different policy domains and by various actors with different 
responsibilities and competences.12 The assumption upon which this paper builds, then, is 
that enhancing interconnectedness within a fragmented FRM system (i.e. creating or 
intensifying interactions between all relevant actors) is essential to cope with the difficulties 
relating to fragmentation, and thus will benefit the effectiveness of FRM.13 The specific 
instruments through which this is done in this paper are referred to as bridging mechanisms.14 
Indeed, a wide range of (types of) bridging mechanism can be discerned throughout the EU, 
mostly aimed at sharing information, coordination of policies and cooperation. Although 
specific examples of bridging mechanisms VXFK DV WKH µWater THVW¶ RU LQVWUXPHQWV DOLNH
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have already been examined in (domestic) literature,15 there is not yet a consistent typology, 
nor a coherent framework for the evaluation of the desirable effects and effectiveness of such 
instruments. This paper contributes to the development thereof.             
For this purpose, this paper builds upon results of cross-disciplinary research carried out 
within the µ67$5-)/22'¶ project, which examined flood risk governance arrangements 
across six EU Member States,16 from legal, public administration and policy perspectives. It 
draws from the results of qualitative analysis of domestic FRM governance arrangements and 
positive legal analysis of relevant primary and secondary legal sources. These findings were 
further enriched by semi-structured interviews with past and current FRM experts, analyzed 
according to qualitative thematic analysis.17 On the basis of this rich body of data and further 
theoretical reasoning, this paper first introduces a typology of and elaborates upon the 
concept of fragmentation and its related difficulties (Section 2). Thereafter, the paper 
addresses the concepts of bridging mechanisms and interconnectedness (Section 3). 
Empirical data concerning the degrees and types of fragmentation and bridging mechanisms 
are presented in Section 4 by virtue of an exemplification of the previous sections. 
Addressing a knowledge gap and for the purpose of facilitating future (comparative) research, 
Section 5 of this paper outlines a novel interdisciplinary methodological framework for 
structured in-depth evaluations of the degree and quality of interconnectedness within 
fragmented domestic FRM systems. The paper concludes with key findings and an open 
invitation for future research (Section 6).                                                    
2. Fragmentation  
The concept of fragmentation has been the focus of international legal research for almost 
two decades.18 Soon after its emergence, this concept was also adopted by other disciplines, 
such as global (environmental) governance.19 Fragmentation is commonly defined as the 
VLWXDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK D µJRYHUQDQFH DUFKLWHFWXUH¶ LV QRW UHJXODWHG RU GRPLQDWHG E\ a single 
(international) regime,20 EXW LQVWHDG LV ³PDUNHGE\DSDWFKZRUNRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV
that are different in their character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their 
constituencies (public and private), their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), and their 
VXEMHFWPDWWHUIURPVSHFLILFSROLF\ILHOGVWRXQLYHUVDOFRQFHUQV´21  
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OECD 2014; Van Rijswick 2014; Kaufmann et al. 2015; Mees et al. 2015; Alexander et al. 2015; Larrue et al. 
2015; and Matczak et al. 2015.  
16
 The Member States participating in this project were Belgium, England (UK), France, the Netherlands, 
Poland, and Sweden. Sweden, for practical reasons, was excluded from this paper. The remaining countries, 
KHUHLQDIWHUDUHUHIHUUHGWRDVµWKHVHOHFWHGFRXQWULHV¶ 
17
 See Cassell & Symon (eds.) 2004.   
18
 See, for instance, Hafner 2000; Koskenniemi & Leino 2002; Hafner 2004; ILC 2006; Martineau 2009; and 
Fauchald & Nollkaemper (eds.) 2012.      
19
 See, for instance, Bernstein & Ivanova 2007; Biermann et al. 2009; Zelli 2011; and Zelli & Van Asselt 2013. 
20
 7KHWHUPµJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHDUFKLWHFWXUHV¶QRZDGD\VLVDNH\WHUPLQOLWHUDWXUHDERXWIUDJPHQWDWLRQ,WLV
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Fragmentation, at first, had a negative connotation, as it was argued it could, for instance, 
OHDGWROHJDOXQFHUWDLQW\WKUHDWVWRWKH³FUHGLELOLW\UHOLability and, consequently, authority of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ DQG FRXOG QHJDWLYHO\ DIIHFW LWV HIIHFWLYHQHVV22 Over time, most of this 
negativity was soothed. The consequences of fragmentation were rather framed as 
µGLIILFXOWLHV¶ RU µFKDOOHQJHV¶ LQVWHDG RI µSUREOHPV¶ RU µULVNV¶ DQG IUDJPHQWDWLRQ LWVHOI ZDV
viewed as an inevitable result of intrinsically positive developments, such as diversification 
and expansion of (international) regimes.23  
Unsurprisingly, most global governance architectures are fragmented, although the degree of 
fragmentation is varied.24 Less frequently, the concept of fragmentation is cut loose from its 
international environment and ± in a somewhat or heavily altered form ± transplanted into an 
EU, domestic or regional context.25 Also at these levels, different degrees and types of 
fragmentation seem to be omnipresent. This paper is situated in this context and focuses on 
the degree (Section 2.1) and types (Section 2.2) of fragmentation evident in domestic FRM 
systems in selected EU Member States.    
2.1. The degree of fragmentation 
7R JHW D EHWWHU YLHZ LQWR IUDJPHQWDWLRQ DV RQH RI WKLV SDSHU¶V NH\ FRQFHSWV D QXPEHU RI
central terms needs to be exemplified. For the purpose of this paper, the term Flood Risk 
Management (FRM) system is conceptualized as the overarching domestic institutional 
system, comprising all (types of) actors, values, principles, norms, rules, regulations, and 
procedures relating to flood risk management.26 Flood risk management, in turn, refers to all 
(types of) activities that address the exposure, hazard and consequences of flood risk, enacted 
through the five FRM strategies previously mentioned.27 The key players within FRM 
systems ± in this paper referred to as actors ± can be public or private entities, organizations, 
departments, groups or even individuals which have been assigned a specific set of FRM 
related responsibilities and competences, either legally established through statutes or 
custom, or else encouraged through public policy. Hence, actors are primarily to be 
distinguished by their specific responsibilities and competences in their pursuit of certain 
FRM strategies.     
All actors contribute to the achievement of the same overall objective (i.e. effective FRM), 
but they can only make use of the specific competences and instruments at their disposal, and 
they can only be held legally accountable for the fulfillment of the specific tasks that have 
been imposed on them. The degree of fragmentation of an FRM system could, then, be 
                                               
22
 See Hafner 2004 (quotation at p. 35); Ambrus et al. 2014; and Kotzé 2014.    
23
 6HH6LPPD7KLVµQHXWUDO¶DSSURDFKLVDOVRDWWKHEDVLVRIWKLVSDSHU 
24
 See Biermann et al. 2009, pp. 17-18. Biermann et al. distinguish between three degrees of fragmentation 
(Biermann et al. 2009, pp. 19-21): synergistic fragmentation (high level of integration), cooperative 
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QRLQWHJUDWLRQ,QWKLVUHVSHFWµIXOO
LQWHJUDWLRQ¶FDQEHVHHQDVWKHRSSRVLWHRIIUDJPHQWDWLRQ 
25
 See, for instance, Edler & Kuhlmann 2008; Bakker & Cook 2011; and Ambrus et al. 2014.   
26
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al. 2009, p. 15.       
27
 These are, hereinafter, in short referred to as 1) prevention, 2) defence, 3) mitigation, 4) preparation & 
response, and 5) recovery. See Van Rijswick & Havekes 2012, p. 251; and Hegger et al. 2014. 
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determined by assessing the quantity of involved actors with distinct responsibilities and 
competences in the pursuit of FRM strategies. If all responsibilities and competences relevant 
to FRM ± in a hypothetical situation ± are assigned to a single omnipotent actor, the system is 
not fragmented, but fully integrated. The more actors have closely related or even 
overlapping responsibilities and competences in the pursuit of FRM strategies, the higher is 
the degree of fragmentation (see Figure 1). However, this does not say much about the types 
of fragmentation and their related difficulties (see Section 2.2).   
                      
Star  = Actor 
Circle  = FRM system 
Box = FRM strategy 
Arrow = Relationship between actor and strategy  
     in terms of responsibilities and competences  
 
Figure 1: Fully integrated as opposed to fragmented (FRM) systems   
2.2. Four types of fragmentation 
Distinguishing types of fragmentation adds much complexity to this concept, but is necessary 
for the purpose of this paper. Analyzing the degree of fragmentation could, after all, only 
determine the number of bridging mechanisms needed and their preferred points within the 
FRM system (i.e. the degree of interconnectedness within an FRM system; see Section 3.2). 
Determining the type of fragmentation could determine whether there is a relation between 
specific types of bridging mechanisms and specific types of fragmentation, which is far more 
informative, as this is useful for evaluating the quality of the interconnectedness within FRM 
systems (see Section 3.3). Based on the policy domains in which actors operate28 and the 
FRM strategies they pursue, a distinction can be made between four basic types of 
fragmentation. These are schematically depicted in Figure 2.29   
                                               
28
 A policy domain is defined as a delimited and coherent institutional system of actors, values, principles, 
norms, regulations and procedures, and ± for the specific purpose of this paper ± in which actors bear certain 
responsibilities and competences relating to one or more FRM strategies. Note the similarities and differences 
EHWZHHQWKHGHILQLWLRQVRIWKHWHUPVµ)50V\VWHP¶DQGµSROLF\GRPDLQ¶7KHUHLQGHHGLVDFORVHUHODWLRQ
between both concepts. The FRM system of a country is constituted by all distinct policy domains in which 
DFWRUVEHDUUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDQGFRPSHWHQFHVUHODWLQJWR)500RVWFRXQWULHV¶)50V\VWHPVDUHQRWSROLF\
GRPDLQVLQWKHPVHOYHVDVWKH\ODFNLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHOLPLWDWLRQDQGFRKHUHQFHDQGDUHµVKDWWHUHG¶RYHU different 
policy domains. 
29
 Approaching the concept from a different perspective, this distinction essentially differs from the one 
Biermann et al. (2009) make.   
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Star  = Actor 
Circle  = Policy domain 
Box = FRM strategy 
Arrow = Relationship between actor and strategy  
     in terms of responsibilities and competences  
 
Figure 2: Four types of fragmentation30 
These four types of fragmentation, hereinafter, are referred to as µType 1¶, µType 2¶, µType 3¶, 
and µType 4¶ fragmentation, respectively. Below, these four types are explained and 
illustrated through simple examples. It should be kept in mind, however, that these types of 
fragmentation represent the most simplified situations possible; these are based on sets of two 
actors. In practice, combinations of fragmentation types are present and regularly multiple 
(sets of) actors are involved. In fact, every fragmented FRM system could be considered a 
complex combination of fragmentation types.    
Type 1 fragmentation refers to situations in which distinct actors operating in different policy 
domains pursue different FRM strategies. Example: Water Management Authority A operates 
within the distinct Water Resources Management domain and pursues the defense strategy. 
Spatial Planning Authority B operates within another domain (Spatial Planning) and pursues 
the mitigation strategy.   
Type 2 fragmentation refers to situations in which distinct actors operating in the same policy 
domain pursue the same FRM strategy. Example: Emergency Management Authority C 
operates within the Emergency Management policy domain and pursues the preparation & 
response strategy. At the same time, also Emergency Service D and Utility Provider E 
operate within that domain and have certain responsibilities in the pursuit of the preparation 
& response strategy.     
Type 3 fragmentation refers to situations in which distinct actors operating in different policy 
domains pursue the same FRM strategy. Example: Water Management Authority F and 
Emergency Management Authority G operate within different policy domains (Water 
Resources Management and Emergency Management, respectively). Nonetheless, within the 
framework of those distinct domains, they have specific responsibilities and competences in 
the pursuit of the preparation & response strategy.   
                                               
30
 Note that the circle in Figure 2 represents a policy domain, where in Figure 1 it represents an FRM system. 
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Type 4 fragmentation refers to situations in which distinct actors operating in the same policy 
domain pursue different FRM strategies. Example: Water Management Authority H and 
Spatial Planning Authority I opeUDWHZLWKLQRQHRYHUDUFKLQJSROLF\GRPDLQµ0DQDJHPHQWRI
WKH/LYLQJ(QYLURQPHQW¶1RQHWKHOHVVWKHRQHEHDUVRQO\UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVIRUWKHSXUVXLWRI
the defense strategy, whereas the other is exclusively responsible for mitigation.     
3. Bridging mechanisms and interconnectedness 
As stated before, this paper builds upon the assumption that enhancing interconnectedness 
within fragmented FRM systems (i.e. creating or intensifying effective interrelations between 
relevant actors at relevant points within the system) benefits the effectiveness of FRM.31 The 
instruments used for this purpose, here, are referred to as bridging mechanisms. The term 
bridging mechanisms is conceptualized as all kinds of inter-linkages between sets of actors, 
aiming to intensify interactions in their pursuit of various FRM strategies in order to cope 
with the difficulties relating to fragmentation. As these difficulties are varied, also different 
types of bridging mechanisms can be distinguished (Section 3.1). Apart from having proper 
types of bridging mechanisms in place at relevant points within an FRM system, bridging 
mechanisms should also be effective themselves in order to foster effectiveness of FRM. In 
other words, both the degree (Section 3.2) and the quality (Section 3.3) of interconnectedness 
are important indicators for the effectiveness of fragmented FRM systems, and thus constitute 
a basis for the evaluation of such systems.             
3.1. Three types of bridging mechanisms                      
As bridging mechanisms have been defined as inter-linkages between actors in order to cope 
with the potential difficulties relating to fragmentation, it is of primary importance to first 
identify and specify these potential difficulties. In this respect, three types of situations can 
immediately be discerned. These are 1) situations in which the one actor lacks and the other 
actor has information or experience which is needed for policy-making in the pursuit of a 
specific FRM strategy for which the former actor is responsible; 2) situations in which the 
policies of an actor in the pursuit of a specific FRM strategy can hinder another actor in the 
pursuit of the same or another strategy (or otherwise (negatively) influence its policy-
making); and 3) situations in which actors pursue the same FRM strategy, whilst on the basis 
of their distinct competences none of them is capable of achieving their goal without the 
efforts of the other.              
Having identified these three types of difficulties, a next step is to identify µsolutions¶ that can 
mitigate their adverse effects. This leads to the identification of three types of bridging 
mechanisms (see Table 1). A lack of information or experience requires information flows 
from the actor who has the relevant information towards the actor who needs this information 
in order to make a proper and well-informed (policy) decision. These types of bridging 
mechanisms, in this paper, are referred to as information and/or experience transferring 
                                               
31
 See, for instance, Matczak et al. 2016, pp. 33-34.      
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mechanisms or, in brief, transfer mechanisms.32 The second difficulty requires some kind of 
alignment between the policies of both actors, in order to keep them both informed about 
their performance of duties, preventing their policies to be at odds and/or become impossible 
to implement. Such bridging mechanisms are referred to as coordination mechanisms.33 In 
the third situation-type both actors are dependent on each other for achieving their shared 
goals, which leads to the need for joint policies and/or working or, in terms of this paper, the 
need for cooperation mechanisms.34 It should be kept in mind that, in practice, these types of 
bridging mechanisms can have many different appearances,35 both regarding their degree of 
formality, and their intensity and form of interaction.         
 
As a closing remark, while bridging mechanisms aim to mitigate the (inevitable) difficulties 
relating to fragmentation, it should be kept in mind that there are also other ways to resolve 
IUDJPHQWDWLRQ7KHVHGRQRWDLPDWµPDQDJLQJLWVV\PSWRPV¶WKURXJKFUHDWLQJRULQWHQVifying 
interactions between actors, but at combatting the degree of fragmentation itself. Such 
interventions do not meet the definition of bridging mechanisms presented in this paper and 
should therefore not be considered as such. Nonetheless, they are worth mentioning, because 
they are to be considered potential additional or even alternative strategies in coping with 
fragmentation and practice provides some interesting examples.36 In particular, one can think 
of three types of systemic changes. These are 1) the integration of policy domains, 2) the 
integration of strategies, for instance, by adopting overarching standards, and 3) the transferal 
of tasks, responsibilities and competences from one actor to another.37 The former two 
interventions mainly induce a shift from the one type of fragmentation to another, whereas 
the latter actually reduces the degree of fragmentation.   
                                               
32
 7UDQVIHUPHFKDQLVPVFDQKDYHµRQH-ZD\¶RUµWZR-ZD\¶RUHYHQµPXOWLSOH-ZD\¶HIIHFWVDLPLQJDW
information transfer or exchange respectively. Examples of transfer mechanisms are inter-organizational 
communication and other information-sharing or exchange structures, such as shared databases or maps, but 
also consulting or advisory mechanisms.    
33
 Examples of coordination mechanisms are (general or specific) duties to align policies, duties to take certain 
policies into account in other policy or decision-making procedures, but also vertical (top-down) steering 
mechanisms, such as inter-governmental instructions.  
34
 Examples of cooperation mechanisms are (general or specific) duties to cooperate, inter-governmental 
agreements, shared policies, covenants, and joint working structures.   
35
 2QHFRXOGHYHQWKLQNRIµFRPELQHGPHFKDQLVPV¶VXFKDVPHFKDQLVPVWKDWDLPDWERWKJHQHUDWLQJ
information flows and cooperation between actors.  
36
 A clear example is the Dutch Environmental Planning Act, which intendedly is to enter into force by 2018. 
This Act integrates a number of policy domains (e.g. water management, spatial planning, environmental 
protection, archeology, and monuments conservation) into one legal and policy framework. There still will be 
several actors responsible for specific aspects of environmental protection in a broad sense, but this act also 
SURYLGHVIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\WRIRUPXODWHVKDUHGREMHFWLYHVUHIHUUHGWRDVµomgevingswaarden¶7KHHQWU\LQWR
force will not lead to a fully integrated FRM system, but (in terms of this paper) will effectuate a shift from 
µ7\SH¶IUDJPHQWDWLRQWRµ7\SH¶IUDJPHQWDWLRQ)RUFORVHUUHDGLQJVHHIRULQVWDQFH1LMHQKXLVDQG
Nijmeijer 2014.     
37
 This former actor can be an existing actor (for instance an organ of a municipality), but also a newly 
established actor. Dutch Security Regions can, for instance, be considered newly (2010) established actors.     
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3.2. The degree of interconnectedness: are proper types of bridging mechanisms present at 
relevant points? 
After having identified three types of bridging mechanisms, the degree of interconnectedness 
is to be addressed. The degree of interconnectedness of a fragmented FRM system can be 
considered optimal if all proper types of bridging mechanisms are present at all relevant 
points within the system. Relevant points can easily be determined through identifying all 
actor sets within a system; these are the points on which difficulties relating to fragmentation 
SRWHQWLDOO\HPHUJHEHFDXVHDFWRUVµPHHW¶HDFKRWKHUWKHUH The main question, thus, remains 
which types of bridging mechanisms are to be considered appropriate under specific 
circumstances. Whereas these specific circumstances are mainly determined by the types of 
fragmentation and their related potential difficulties, Table 2 gives an overview of the types 
of bridging mechanisms that should be present at a relevant point within a fragmented FRM 
system given a certain type of fragmentation. On the basis of this table, for all relevant 
points/identified actor sets the appropriate combination of types of bridging mechanisms can 
be determined.                       
 
On the basis of Table 2, both transfer and coordination mechanisms should in principle be 
present under all types of fragmentation. This can be explained by the fact that a lack of 
information or experience or a clash of policies can emerge regardless of whether relevant 
actors operate within the same policy domain or pursue the same FRM strategy. Only when 
actors do pursue the same FRM strategy ± irrespective of whether they operate within the 
same policy domain ± a cooperation mechanism should in principle be in place in order to 
deal with their mutual dependency in the pursuit of their shared strategy µ7\SH¶DQGµ7\SH
¶ IUDJPHQWDWLRQ. As there will be no evident mutual dependency between actors in the 
pursuit of different FRM strategies, there is no direct need for cooperation mechanisms under 
such circumstances µ7\SH¶DQGµ7\SH¶IUDJPHQWDWLRQ From the perspective of potential 
difficulties, µType 2¶ and µType 3¶ fragmentation can, thus, be considered as more µcomplex¶ 
than the other two types, requiring a wider range of specific types of bridging mechanisms.                             
3.3. The quality of interconnectedness: are the identified bridging mechanisms effective 
themselves? 
Apart from the degree of interconnectedness, also its quality is a key indicator for the 
effectiveness of FRM. To get an overall view of the quality of the interconnectedness within 
an FRM system, the effectiveness of all bridging mechanisms present within an FRM system 
should be evaluated separately. Apart from describing these mechanisms and especially their 
specific goals in more detail, such an evaluation should follow a pre-determined and pre-
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operationalized set of indicators and/or benchmarks, and ± in addition to desk studies ± may 
require stakeholder/expert involvement through interviews and focus group sessions.38 
Inspired by interdisciplinary research about the effectiveness of responsibilities for climate 
adaptation in vulnerable network sectors, suggested indicators for the effectiveness of 
bridging mechanisms are their explicitness/transparency, enforceability/compliance, and 
legitimacy/support.39 Given the interdisciplinary approach of this paper, also the suggested 
LQGLFDWRUVDUHRIDµPL[HG¶QDWXUH, comprising legal and governance aspects.  
In order to meet the first criterion (explicitness/transparency), the responsibilities relating to 
bridging mechanisms, as to their specific goals and application, should be formulated as clear 
and detailed as possible, in order to provide an optimal degree of legal certainty. It does not 
matter whether this is done through legislation or guiding, explanatory or policy documents, 
as long as all responsibilities are knowable (who is responsible?) and clear (what does this 
responsibility imply?) to all relevant actors and other potentially interested parties. Moreover, 
a bridging mechanisms especially established for specific FRM purposes can be considered 
more explicit than very generally formulated and applicable mechanisms aiming at, for 
instance, the coordination of an unspecified number of tasks.40  
Responsibilities should not only be knowable and clear, but should also be enforceable. This 
means that effective instruments should be in place to force relevant actors to comply with 
their (mutual) responsibilities. One could think of court procedures, mediation tracks, or other 
dispute settlement constructions, but also of inter-administrative supervisory structures, 
penalty or liability systems, or even naming and shaming constructions. Regarding their 
formalized nature, statutory bridging mechanisms can be expected to be better enforceable 
than informal bridging mechanisms. This, however, is not to say that informal bridging 
mechanisms by definition are less effective than their statutory counterparts.41      
The latter indicator requires the responsibilities resulting from bridging mechanisms to be 
legitimate in legal terms (democratically legitimate) and also to be conceived as legitimate 
(or supported) by the relevant actors. This means that bridging mechanisms should have been 
developed under legitimate legal conditions (e.g. a proper (democratic) legislative process, 
taking into account all relevant interests), and that relevant actors and other potentially 
interested parties should properly have been involved, have had a chance to actively 
participate, in the development thereof. Moreover, this indicator requires that the 
responsibilities resulting from bridging mechanisms are ± from a more subjective perspective 
± considered reasonable and acceptable by those who are responsible and accountable.42         
                                               
38
 See, for instance, Morgan 1996; Wilson 2012a; Wilson 2012b; Säynäjoki et al. 2014; and Runhaar et al. 2015, 
pp. 8-9.  
39
 See Runhaar et al. 2014; Gilissen et al. 2015; Runhaar et al. 2015; and Gilissen et al. 2016b. Also see Adger et 
al. 2005; Van Rijswick & Salet 2012; Van Buuren et al. 2014; Hegger et al. 2014; Mees et al. 2014; and 
Pettersson et al. 2016.   
40
 See Buijze 2013; Mees et al. 2014; Runhaar et al. 2015, pp. 4 and 8-10; Gilissen et al. 2015, pp. 1643-1644 
and 1646-1647; Van den Broek 2015; and Gilissen et al. 2016b, pp. 7-8.  
41
 See Blomberg & Michiels 1997; Jans et al. 2007; and Buijze 2009. 
42
 See Bekkers & Edwards 2007; Mees et al. 2014; Runhaar et al. 2015, pp. 4 and 8-9; and Gilissen et al. 2015, 
pp. 1644 and 1647.  
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4. Country analyses: examples from empirical research 
The above sections give theoretical ± and admittedly rather abstract ± insight into the 
concepts of fragmentation, bridging mechanisms and interconnectedness, and the relations 
between these concepts. In this section, empirical data are presented about the degree and 
specific types of fragmentation, as well as about different types of bridging mechanisms in 
the ILYHVHOHFWHGFRXQWULHV¶)50V\VWHPV. In doing so, we do not intend to give a full view of 
the domestic situations, but rather intend to further substantiate and exemplify the concepts 
discussed above and to give an impression of the degree and types of fragmentation and the 
bridging mechanisms present in the selected countries. Thus, we intend to stimulate further 
in-depth research into these (and other) FRXQWULHV¶)50V\VWHPV As stated in the introduction 
of this paper, the data presented here result from empirical research conducted within the EU 
SURMHFW µ67$5-)/22'¶. These data, however, as results of the broader research project, 
were also in part at the basis of the development of these concepts as such (also see Section 
1). In turn, these conceptual and empirical data are also at the basis of the evaluation 
framework presented in Section 5 of this paper.      
4.1. The degree and types of fragmentation in the selected countries 
Unsurprisingly, all selected domestic FRM systems show a certain degree of fragmentation, 
as in all countries distinct actors within distinct policy domains have distinct responsibilities 
and competences in the pursuit of distinct FRM strategies (see examples in Tables 3.1 to 3.5). 
Hence, aOVRGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIIUDJPHQWDWLRQDUHSUHVHQWZLWKLQWKHVHOHFWHGFRXQWULHV¶)50
systems (see Tables 4.1 to 4.5). As an in-depth description of all domestic situations does not 
suit the scope of this paper,43 a number of particularities, similarities and differences are 
discussed below. Although also other policy domains are relevant in relation to FRM, the 
focus below is on the domains of water management, spatial planning and emergency 
management.   
First focusing on the degree of fragmentation, there are striking differences as to the 
distinction between relevant policy domains in which actors bear responsibilities and 
competences for the pursuit of FRM strategies. This is important for determining the degree 
(and types) of fragmentation of a domestic FRM system. In France, for instance, five relevant 
policy domains are distinguished in which a specialized actor bears responsibilities for 
multiple strategies, resulting into multiple actors operating in different policy domains being 
partly responsible for the pursuit of the same strategy (see Table 3.3). In England, for the 
purpose of this paper, three policy domains are distinguished, but responsibilities for the 
pursuit of their corresponding FRM strategies are divided between a large number of actors 
within those domains (see Table 3.1). In Poland, the Flemish Region (Belgium) and the 
Netherlands, also three policy domains are distinguished in which one or a few actors bear 
responsibilities for a single or a limited number of FRM strategies (see Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 
3.5). As the number of actors per policy domain in these countries is limited and the 
responsibilities for certain strategies are rather straightforwardly divided per policy domain, 
                                               
43
 For more in-depth analyses, see Alexander et al. 2015; Kaufmann et al. 2015; Larrue et al. 2015; Matczak et 
al. 2015; Mees et al. 2015; and Matczak et al. 2016.    
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the degree of fragmentation in England and France is considerably higher than in the other 
countries.   
Focusing on types of fragmentation, a first finding LV WKDW DOO FRXQWULHV¶ HPHUJHQF\
PDQDJHPHQWDUUDQJHPHQWVFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGD IRUPRIµ7\SH¶IUDJPHQWDWLRQ (see Tables 
4.1 to 4.5). Although these arrangements substantively vary (mainly as to the division of 
responsibilities between distinct actors or actor groups), they have in common that they all 
constitute a distinct policy domain in which distinct (groups of) actors pursue the same FRM 
strategy (preparation & response). In England, in this respect, a statutory division is made 
between coordinating government departments, Category 1 Responders (mainly emergency 
services), Category 2 Responders (e.g. utility services), and the voluntary sector. In the other 
countries, a distinction is made between specialized Emergency Management Authorities (at 
different levels and of different compositions) and emergency services, and in some cases 
utility services and the voluntary sector.44 In the Netherlands, Poland and England, also actors 
within other policy domains have certain responsibilities in the pursuit of the preparation & 
response strategy.45 7KLVLVKRZHYHUWREHFRQVLGHUHGDIRUPRIµ7\SH¶IUDJPHQWDWLRQVHH
Tables 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5).  
Also other types of fragmentation are present within the FRM systems of the selected 
countries. However, in none of the countries µ7\SH¶ fragmentation can be discerned (see 
Tables 4.1 to 4.5). This type of fragmentation, thus, seems to be rare. In the Netherlands, 
KRZHYHUDIRUPRIµ7\SH¶IUDJPHQWDWLRQLVHPHUJLQJDVWKHLQWHQGHGOHJDOLQWHJUDWLRQRI
the policy domains of Water System Management and Spatial Planning into the single policy 
GRPDLQ RI µ(QYLURQPHQWDO 3ODQQLQJ¶ ZLOO OHDG WR D VLWXDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK two distinct actors 
(SPAs and WMAs) will pursue different strategies (prevention/mitigation and defense, 
respectively) while operating within the same policy domain.46 Forms of µ7\SH ¶
fragmentation are the most common and eminent in Poland, the Flemish Region (Belgium) 
and the Netherlands, as in these countries a rather strict distinction is made between policy 
domains, corresponding strategies and (single) actors who bear responsibilities in this respect 
(see Tables 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5).47 Due to the specific degrees of fragmentation in England and 
)UDQFH VHH DERYH LQ WKHVH FRXQWULHV µ7\SH ¶ DQG µ7\SH ¶ IUDJPHQWDWLRQ DUH PRUH
common, respectively (see Tables 4.1 and 4.3). The selected policy domains in England, after 
all, show a wide range of actors that pursue the same strategy, while in France, a wide range 
of actors operating in different policy domains pursue the same strategy with different means. 
                                               
44
 See, for instance, Brainich & Helsloot 2014; and Muller 2014.  
45
 See, for instance, Havekes & De Putter 2014, pp. 161-168.  
46
 For closer reading, see (for instance) Nijenhuis 2014; and Nijmeijer 2014. 
47
 Flemish water management, however, includes several water managers, respectively the Department of 
Mobility & Public Works for navigable watercourses, the Flemish Environment Agency for non-navigable 
watercourses 1st category, the provinces for non-navigable watercourses 2nd category and the municipalities for 
non-navigable watercourses 3rd category (although since 2014, most 3rd category watercourses are under the 
auspices of the provinces). At locations where a polder or wateringue is still active, the management of 2nd and 
3rd category non-navigable watercourses is under their charge. For the sake of clarity, these have been classified 
under the policy domain water management. Coordination between these water managers happens through the 
Coordination Committee on Integrated Water Policy (Decree Integral Water Policy 2003) on the basis of the 
2003 DIWP, which strives for integrated water management, and thus pertains to management of water 
resources, spatial planning, and so forth. 
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Lastly, two particular forms of fragmentation deserve to be mentioned here. In the Flemish 
Region (Belgium), the Netherlands, and Poland, responsibilities within certain policy 
domains (spatial planning; emergency management) are divided between a number of actors 
at different administrative levels. In most cases there are also hierarchical relations between 
these actors.48 This form of µYHUWLFDO¶ IUDJPHQWDWLRQ can be considered a specific form of 
µ7\SH ¶ IUDJPHQWDWLRQ VHH 7DEOHV 4.2 and 4.4). Another particular IRUP RI µ7\SH ¶
fragmentation ± that, for the sake of clarity, has not been included in the tables below, but is 
nonetheless worth mentioning ± FDQ EH UHIHUUHG WR DV µDUHDO¶ IUDJPHQWDWLRQ This form of 
fragmentation emerges where the same type of actors (local or regional authorities) have the 
same type of responsibilities and competences for governing distinct (neighboring) areas. 
This form of fragmentation, can be seen as resulting from decentralization and is highly 
common across the selected and other decentralized countries.                             
 
 
 
                                               
48
 See, for instance, Korsse 2014.  
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4.2. Bridging mechanisms in the selected countries 
Having presented examples of the degrees and types of fragmentation in the selected 
countries in the previous section, this section focuses on types of bridging mechanisms 
present in those countries. It should be mentioned here that it is impossible, within the scope 
of one paper, to give a full view and an in-depth description of all bridging mechanisms 
present, let alone to thoroughly evaluate the degree and quality of the interconnectedness 
ZLWKLQ WKH VHOHFWHG FRXQWULHV¶ FRM systems. Instead, a number of examples are presented 
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below (Tables 5.1 to 5.5). For further evaluations of the interconnectedness within domestic 
FRM systems, the evaluation framework presented in Section 5 is recommended, as 
specifically developed for this purpose.       
In all countries, the relations between actors within the spatial planning domain and the 
domain of flood/water management49 LV FRQVLGHUHG D IRUP RI µ7\SH ¶ IUDJPHQWDWLRQ DV
different actors or actor groups operating in distinct policy domains pursue different 
strategies. In order to resolve potential difficulties resulting therefrom, all countries have 
implemented specific transfer mechanisms. Moreover, most countries ± except for Poland 
and France ± have also implemented coordination mechanisms (see Tables 5.1 to 5.5). It is 
striking that all transfer mechanisms, although highly different in nature, appear as advisory 
or consulting structures on the basis of which actors specialized in FRM have advising or 
consulting roles in spatial decision making. Well known examples are the Dutch50 and 
Flemish51 variants of the µWater Test¶, but similar statutory structures are present in 
England,52 France,53 and Poland.54 Coordination mechanisms vary from general statutory 
obligations to align spatial and water policies (the Netherlands),55 to the establishment of 
specialized coordination committees (Flanders),56 and the continued coordinating effects of 
the advisory/consulting mechanisms mentioned (England and Flanders).57  
$QHYLGHQWIRUPRIµ7\SH¶IUagmentation in all selected countries are the relations between 
relevant actors within the emergency management policy domain. Also in this respect, the 
distinct countries have developed highly different arrangements,58 but the degree of 
interconnectedness at first glance can be considered optimal, as all countries have 
implemented specific transfer, coordination, as well as cooperation mechanisms (see Table 
5.1 to 5.5). Transfer mechanisms range from statutory duties to share information (England), 
to information exchange structures in the framework of established committees or crisis 
centres (Flanders, Poland), and different types of consultation or participation structures 
(France, the Netherlands). Coordination mechanisms are also varied, as coordination in some 
countries is promoted through specific (resilience) fora, committees or crisis centres 
(England, Flanders), whereas in other countries this is mainly done through alignment of 
strategic and operational policies (France, the Netherlands). Also cooperation structures vary 
from statutory duties to cooperate (England), to (ad-hoc or formalized) cooperation in the 
framework of specific institutions (Poland, Belgium), periodical exercises (France) and/or 
semi-formal instruments, such as covenants (the Netherlands).   
                                               
49
 These policy domains are referred to differently in the selected countries.    
50
 See Groothuijse & Van Rijswick 2005; Groothuijse 2009; Van Rijswick & Havekes 2012; Gilissen, Kevelam 
& Van Rijswick 2014; OECD 2014; Van Rijswick 2014; and Kaufmann et al. 2015.    
51
 See Denys & Toury 2012; Ameloot 2013; Carette & De Smedt 2013; and Mees et al. 2015.  
52
 See Alexander et al. 2015.  
53
 See Larrue et al. 2015.  
54
 See Matczak et al. 2015.  
55
 See Havekes & De Putter 2014.   
56
 See De Smedt 2003; and Carette & De Smedt 2013.  
57
 See Alexander et al. 2015; and Mees et al. 2015.  
58
 See Gilissen et al. 2016a.   
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$VSHFLILFIRUPRIµ7\SH¶IUDJPHQWDWLRQHPHUJHVin England, the Netherlands and Poland, 
as in these countries distinct actors operating within distinct policy domains pursue the 
preparation & response strategy with different means (see Tables 5.1, 5.4 and 5.5). Only in 
the Netherlands, transfer and coordination mechanisms in this respect have a firm legal basis. 
Information transfer is promoted though consultation and the formal role of Water 
0DQDJHPHQW$XWKRULWLHV LQ WKH6HFXULW\5HJLRQV¶ERard meetings. Coordination is fostered 
through the compulsory alignment of strategic and operational emergency plans of relevant 
Water Management Authorities and Emergency Management Authorities. Cooperation, in the 
Netherlands, largely takes place on an informal basis (e.g. cooperation in the organization of 
periodical exercises), although formalization has been considered in the past.59 In England, 
although the emergency management as such is highly formalized, information transfer and 
coordination mechanisms between actors within the strict emergency management domain 
and other relevant actors operating in other domains have not been formalized. However, 
their activities are mostly coordinated on a more informal basis.               
 
                                               
59
 See Havekes & De Putter 2014, p. 164.  
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5. Evaluation framework: a seven-step method for future research 
Although the data presented above give an impression of the degree of fragmentation and the 
bridging mechanisms established in order to facilitate interconnectedness within the selected 
countries, on the basis thereof no firm conclusions can yet be drawn about the 
LQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVVZLWKLQWKHVHFRXQWULHV¶)50V\VWHPVA full overview and an analysis of 
WKH TXDOLW\ RI LQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVV ZLWKLQ WKHVH FRXQWULHV¶ )50 V\VWHPV UHTXLUH
comprehensive, structured and more in-depth system evaluations. Since such a framework 
has not yet been developed, this section presents an interdisciplinary methodological 
framework for the evaluation of the interconnectedness within domestic FRM systems 
through seven successive steps. Rooted in the conceptual and empirical analyses above, this 
methodological framework is meant as a guideline for further research.60 A pragmatic, 
flexible and broadly applicable research tool, this framework can prove useful for both 
academic and practical purposes (e.g. concept development, system evaluations, and system 
                                               
60
 Inspiration for this framework was drawn from Runhaar et al. 2014; Runhaar et al. 2015; Gilissen et al. 2015; 
and Gilissen et al. 2016b.   
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(re)development). This novel method comprises seven successive steps, arranged into three 
research phases: 1) the preparatory and analytical phase, 2) the evaluation phase, and 3) the 
phase of reflection and drawing conclusions. In Tables 6.1 to 6.3, the successive steps within 
these phases are schematically presented and shortly exemplified. Also specific research 
techniques are suggested where relevant.    
Phase 1) Preparation and analysis 
7KHSUHSDUDWRU\DQGDQDO\WLFDOSKDVHDLPVDWµVHWWLQJWKHVFHQH¶DQGDQDO\]LQJDQGDUUDQJLQJ
all relevant information in order to perform the evaluation in a structured manner.61 This 
phase comprises three steps. It mainly requires in-depth system analysis, including literature 
review, analysis of legislation, explanatory memoranda and policy documents, and perhaps 
stakeholder/expert involvement through interviews and focus group sessions.62  
 
Phase 2) Evaluation 
The evaluation phase forms the core of this evaluation framework. It comprises two steps, 
mainly building upon the information gathered and arranged during the previous phase/steps. 
Apart from in-depth system and situation analysis, this phase requires the selection and 
operationalization of evaluation criteria for assessing the effectiveness of specific 
arrangements, in this case indicators and/or benchmarks for evaluating the effectiveness of 
bridging mechanisms. Apart from the suggestions for evaluation criteria presented in Section 
3.3, further developing and enriching the set of evaluation criteria may require further studies 
into (methodological) literature.63  
                                               
61
 If the evaluation, moreover, is part of a comparative research project, a structured framework could optimize 
comparative potential. See, for instance, Azarian 2011.    
62
 See, for instance, Morgan 1996; Wilson 2012a; Wilson 2012b; Säynäjoki et al. 2014; and Runhaar et al. 2015, 
pp. 8-9.  
63
 See, for instance, Adger et al. 2005; Van Rijswick & Salet 2012; Van Buuren et al. 2014; Hegger et al. 2014; 
Mees et al. 2014; and Runhaar et al. 2015, p. 4.  
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Phase 3) Conclusions, recommendations and reflection 
The concluding phase comprises two steps. Apart from drawing conclusions about the degree 
and quality of the interconnectedness within (and, thus the effectiveness of) an FRM system 
and, if necessary, formulating recommendations for improvement, the applied method should 
also be reflected upon itself for refining purposes. In case of cross-country comparisons, the 
WUDQVIHUDELOLW\ RI LGHQWLILHG µJRRG SUDFWLFHV¶ can be assessed. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that bridging mechanisms or practices proving effective in the one country, are not 
necessarily as effective in another cultural, political, institutional and normative setting.         
                                                                            
6. Conclusions 
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Diversification of FRM strategies is assumed to enhance societal resilience to flooding and, 
thus, the effectiveness of FRM. In this paper, this assumption is nuanced. Acknowledging 
that diversification indeed is desirable, this paper focuses on fragmentation of domestic FRM 
systems as one of its inevitable side-effects, which can potentially be detrimental to the 
effectiveness of FRM. This paper, therefore, claims that resolving the difficulties relating to 
fragmentation through increasing the interconnectedness between relevant actors within 
fragmented domestic FRM systems is yet another condition for FRM to be effective. The 
instruments suited for this purpose are metaphorically referred to as bridging mechanisms. 
From the perspective of specific difficulties relating to fragmentation, three types of bridging 
mechanisms can be discerned, namely transfer mechanisms, coordination mechanisms, and 
cooperation mechanisms.    
On the basis of the identification of both degrees and types of fragmentation and their relating 
difficulties, specific points within FRM systems can be identified on which specific types of 
bridging mechanisms are needed. Having the appropriate types of bridging mechanisms 
implemented on the relevant points within an FRM system leads to an optimal degree of 
interconnectedness. Apart therefrom, also the quality of interconnectedness is key in order to 
optimally contribute to the effectiveness of FRM as such and, thus, enhance societal 
resilience to flooding. All bridging mechanisms within an FRM system should, in other 
words, be effective themselves as well. The effectiveness of bridging mechanisms can be 
determined following a mixed set of legal and extra-legal indicators, such as transparency, 
enforceability, and legitimacy.  
Building upon empirical research conducted within the framework of the (8SURMHFWµ67$5-
)/22'¶, this paper shows that ± despite a number of similarities ± both the degrees and 
W\SHV RI IUDJPHQWDWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH VHOHFWHG FRXQWULHV¶ )50 V\VWHPV GLIIHU Compared to 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Poland, the overall degree of fragmentation can be considered 
rather high in England and France. In the former countries a limited number of policy 
domains are rather straightforwardly distinguished in which one or a few actors bear 
responsibilities for the pursuit of single or a limited number of FRM strategies. In the latter, 
such responsibilities per policy domain are divided between a large number of actors 
(England), or multiple actors operating in different policy domains are partly responsible for 
the pursuit of the same strategy (France). This leads to the conclusion that there are more 
points within the English and French FRM systems that need bridging mechanisms, than in 
the other countries.    
Although three out of four types of fragmentation are present within all selected countries¶ 
FRM systems, the overall differences in degrees of fragmentation also result into differences 
regarding the dominance of a specific type of fragmentation per country. This paper shows 
that in England and France more µcomplex¶ types of fragmentation (µType 2¶ and µType 3¶, 
respectively) are dominant, whereas in the other countries a µsimple¶ type of fragmentation 
(µType 1¶) is more common. As a striking similarity, all countries¶ emergency management 
arrangements, however, can be considered more complex through the lens of fragmentation 
(µType 2¶). Although this does not say much about the effectiveness of FRM in the respective 
countries, it should be noted that at the points where more complex types of fragmentation 
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are present, also a wider range of bridging mechanisms is needed. Whereas, in terms of this 
paper, in simple situations transfer and coordination mechanisms suffice, in more complex 
situations there is an additional need for cooperation mechanisms. 
An investigation of a selection of types of fragmentation present in the selected countries 
shows that these countries have bridging mechanisms in place at (most) relevant points 
within their FRM systems. In general, in complex situations of fragmentation, these countries 
indeed have implemented specific cooperation mechanisms in addition to transfer and 
coordination mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, all specific bridging mechanisms highly differ as 
to their nature and degree of formality across the selected countries. Nonetheless, there are 
similarities, for instance within the field of spatial planning, where all countries have 
implemented some formalized form of advisory or consulting mechanisms similar to the 
Dutch and Flemish µWater Test¶. Although some blank and unclear spots remain, the overall 
impression is that the degree of interconnectedness within the selected countries ± at least 
regarding the investigated selection of situations of fragmentation ± can be considered 
adequate, if not optimal. 
Despite the positive tenor of the above, it is yet too early to conclude that all difficulties 
relating to fragmentation are properly taken care of, and that the selected countries¶ FRM 
systems, thus, can be considered effective. This is something we just do not and cannot know 
at this stage, simply because there is too little information about the effectiveness of all 
bridging mechanisms in place, and thus about the quality of the interconnectedness. In order 
to draw such conclusions, the effectiveness of every single bridging mechanisms should be 
analyzed and the results thereof should be reflected upon. Here lies one of the major 
challenges for future FRM research. Rooted in its conceptual contemplations and aiming to 
facilitate such future research, this paper therefore outlines a novel interdisciplinary 
methodological framework for evaluating the interconnectedness within domestic FRM 
systems. Given its cross-country comparative potential, the societal issues relating to FRM at 
stake, and the overwhelming amount of work to be done, diversification, fragmentation, 
interconnectedness and the presented evaluation framework could easily be at the basis of a 
follow-up interdisciplinary research project. This is an open invitation; there still are many 
troubled waters to be bridged.                                            
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